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Abstract
Autonomy is expected to cause significant changes to the 
Maritime Traffic System (MTS). The Vessel Traffic Services 
(VTS) is a control system in the MTS and will be affected by 
new interactions caused by autonomy. The paper proposes 
a proactive approach in discussing the future VTS. The paper 
renders the historical development of socio-technical systems 
theory and argues for  systemic evaluation of internal and 
external consequences of changes in the design of the future 
VTS. A democratic process to involve people from the various 
levels of the VTS organisation with different competencies 
is suggested. To evaluate the consequences of change, a 
systemic internal and external approach is suggested. For 
discussing internal consequences, a levelled socio-technical 
systems model is adapted and applied. External consequences 
are suggested to be discussed by applying design principles of 
system-of-systems to understand the interplay between VTS 
and the MTS.
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1 Introduction
The maritime industry is expected to face major changes in the coming decades. 
Technology 4.0, referring to the large-scale interconnection of components, sys-
tems and infrastructure (1), affects existing services and opens for new types of 
services. Autonomous concepts are believed to become a reality as emphasized 
by the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) regulatory scoping exercise 
for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) (2). Exactly how these concepts 
will be realised is still uncertain. The concept closest in time to become a reality 
is the container vessel Yara Birkeland, planned to go into service with shipboard 
personnel in 2020 and gradually move to autonomous operation by 2022 (3). 
Additionally, tests with a self-driving ferry in Finland (4) and a remotely operated 
tug in Denmark (5) have been conducted, and small passenger ferries to replace 
bridges are planned (6,7).
 A future with autonomous vessels will change the maritime industry in many 
ways. However, the change is not merely about the autonomous vessel itself. It is 
also about how it will interact with other actors in the Maritime Traffic System 
(MTS). One important measure for navigational safety in the MTS is the use of 
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) to guide and advise the traffic (8). The VTS is described 
as a control system in the MTS with interactions within the system (the VTS) and 
externally with the systems in its environment (9). A future MTS with autonomous 
vessels will consequently cause changes for the VTS, particularly for the external 
interactions between conventional and autonomous vessels. 
 It is possible to approach the discussion of future VTS in two ways, one is 
reactive, and the other is proactive. The reactive approach is to take a stance that 
autonomy needs to be developed so it has the same capabilities as conventional 
vessels. The convenient consequence for the VTS is business as usual, and it is 
up to the ship designers to solve the challenge of designing technical solutions 
that respond as a human navigator would do. The proactive approach is to 
take ownership to the overall objectives of the MTS to be as safe and efficient 
as possible. However, such an approach is a complex task, since it comes with 
a requirement to jointly consider the VTS and the MTS. A joint consideration 
makes it impossible to understand the actors in the system in isolation but 
requires a holistic approach. This paper suggests that the proactive approach 
is challenging but necessary, and argues this approach requires consideration 
from researchers in the maritime industry.  
 The paper considers the VTS as a socio-technical system (9,10) and explores 
how a systems perspective and the use of a socio-technical systems approach could 
guide the early phase of designing the future VTS. The paper aims to answer the 
following research question:
 How can a socio-technical systems approach focusing on a democratic process, 
 and systemic evaluation of internal and external consequences, be used in the 
 early design phase of the future VTS?
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2 Background
The regulatory scoping exercise for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship (MASS) 
by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) (2) is a manifestation of the 
belief of autonomy being important for the future maritime industry. The IMO 
suggests different degrees of autonomy which are determined by the locus of 
control of the vessel (ship/shore) and by whether there are seafarers on board or 
not. In other transport segments, it is suggested not to use the term autonomy, 
since it is heavily dependent on the opposite of the original meaning of the word, 
namely communication and/or cooperation (11). The term levels of automation 
(LOA) has been used to describe the relationship between human control and 
machine control (12). In the perspective of LOA, the highest level of automation 
has been described as the computer decides everything, acts autonomously and 
ignoring humans (13). Hence, autonomy being a level of automation. The paper 
will consider autonomy as a process where the use of technology implies a sig-
nificant change to the system’s human and technology function allocation (14). 
Such an approach acknowledges that autonomy could be different from system to 
system and opens for many different concepts that all could cause major changes 
in the maritime industry, however, we expect autonomous systems to be able to 
collaborate with other maritime systems.  
2.1 Vessel Traffic Services
The Vessel Traffic Services is one of the measures to meet the governmental respon-
sibility of the safety of navigation and regulation of maritime traffic in maritime 
waters stated in the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
(15). The IMO is responsible for adopting international shipping rules and stan- 
dards, while the individual nations have jurisdiction for their territorial waters 
and nominate a Competent Authority responsible for implementing the VTS. 
International Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) are a substantial contrib-
utor for IMO, and the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and 
Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) is the NGO closest associated with the develop-
ment of the VTS (8). 
 For Norwegian waters, the government executes the responsibility through the 
Ministry of Transportation. The Competent Authority is the Norwegian Coastal 
Administration (NCA), hence being responsible for personnel, equipment, facil-
ities, procedures, finance and legal matters (8). There are five VTS centres, four 
responsible for territorial waters and one for international waters. In addition, 
Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS) are established for transit traffic in international 
waters and in two of the most congested traffic areas in territorial waters (16). 
The individual VTS centres are responsible for everyday activities and in addition 
responsible for adapting the centrally developed procedures to local procedures 
valid for their area.
2.2 The Maritime Traffic System
To evaluate changes to the MTS, it is necessary to clarify what is included in the 
term. The MTS is context-dependent; it will change from one geographical location 
115
to another and change over time. The paper discusses the role of VTS, hence, the 
context is that the VTS is involved in territorial waters where one state has juris-
diction. The term stakeholder is commonly used in systems engineering to identify 
groups or individuals who affect, or being affected by, the achievement of an organ-
isation’s objectives (17). To identify the MTS, systems or stakeholders that affect, or 
being affected by, the achievement of safe navigation is included.
 Van Westrenen and Praetorius (18) state that control in maritime traffic is 
exercised by the bridge team, pilot and VTS. Mansson, Lützhöft and Brooks (19) 
describe key participants in navigating and manoeuvring ships in port waters to 
be the shipmaster, maritime pilot, tug master and the VTS-operator (VTSO). Fiaz 
(20) has analysed stakeholders for navigation and assessed their impact on safety 
and efficiency.  He identified that shipowners, crew, water canals/coastal waters/
straits, IMO, Flag State, Classification societies and educational institute/guideline 
publisher influence safety. 
 In sum, for the MTS the interaction between bridge team, pilot and VTS is 
imperative. However, this interaction is likely to be affected by the organisational 
context, such as identified in the stakeholder analysis where shipowners are men- 
tioned. Consequently, one can assume both pilot organisations and Competent 
Authorities (for the VTS) being important. There are also several other actors such 
as IMO, Flag States, Classification societies, educational institutes, and guideline 
publishers in the stakeholder analysis. The MTS, therefore, consists of the imme- 
diate interaction between the operators involved in navigation in the area, and 
additionally, the organisations and stakeholders affecting their decisions. An ex- 
ample of a future MTS is shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. The Maritime Traffic System (MTS) described as of the vessels in the area (the 
environment) and the VTS as the control system.
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3 Theoretical frame of reference
The share of autonomy will be imperceptible for many years since the great major-
ity of vessels will be conventional. However, in some areas, autonomous vessels 
will have a significant impact on the traffic situation. In these areas, the autono-
mous vessels will coexist with conventional vessels. Such coexistence implies new 
interactions between the actors in the industry. To explain the implications of the 
coexistence in the industry systems theory is applied. The doctrine of expansion-
ism considering objects as a part of the whole is a cornerstone of system theory 
(21), and the paper presents relevant theory to explain a holistic picture of the 
relationship between the actors in the industry. Initially, the taxonomic distinction 
between systems and system-of-systems is presented. Further, the development of 
socio-technical systems theory that origins from the systems theory is presented. 
3.1 System-of-systems
More than 50 years ago Ackoff (22) pointed to the fact that the systems concept 
lacks a unified set of terms, ironically lacking a system for the terms in systems 
science. Consequently, he presents a comprehensive list of terms, where a system 
is defined as a set of interrelated elements. Further, he defines an organisation as a 
purposeful system that contains at least two purposeful elements which have a com-
mon purpose relative to which the system has a functional division of labour (22). He 
differs organisations from organisms by stating that the organisms do not contain 
purposeful elements, and none of the organisms can display will (22). The clarifi-
cation of terms by Ackoff is important and points to a difference between focusing 
on an organisation and an organism. It implies a difference between what could be 
a component in a system and what is a system. However, by zooming out to more 
than one organisation, collaboration and, at least partly, common goals between 
various organisations is found. Large scale, complex, socio-technical systems (such 
as organisations) that collaborate are often named system-of-systems, even though 
not all socio-technical systems are systems-of-systems (23). Similar to Ackoff ’s 
abovementioned challenge about terms for systems, there is no widely accepted 
definition of system-of-systems. 
 Maier (24) aims to create a distinction between a system and a system-of- 
systems. He suggests operational and managerial independence of system com- 
ponents could be used for creating a taxonomic distinction between systems and 
system-of-systems. Further, he emphasizes that the system must pass both the cri- 
teria of operational and managerial independence to be categorised as a system-
of-systems. Being independent and at the same time being a system-of-systems 
could seem contradictory, however; Maier explains that the criteria are to be 
used for collaboratively integrated systems (24). He does not explicitly define 
what collaboratively integrated means, but he states that collaborative is opposed 
to directed, and the decision to collaborate is an on-going discussion, further, he 
uses the synonym ‘federated system’ (24). Hence, it is possible to conclude that 
the systems have some common goals, and the systems see a positive effect of 
collaborating with other systems. 
 The operational independence considers that if a system-of-systems is disassem-
bled, the component systems can operate independently to fulfil their own purposes 
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and they are able to fulfil purposes on their own. Managerial independence consid-
ers that component systems do operate independently, and even if being integrated 
in a superset system, they continue their operational existence independent of the 
system-of-systems.
 An important contribution of Maier’s work on differentiating systems and system- 
of-systems, is his work on defining successful design criteria. The independent 
properties of system-of-systems require a different mindset for the design. Maier 
suggests designers of system-of-systems need to follow the design principles of policy 
triage (choosing what to control), leverage at the interface (between the component 
systems), stable intermediate forms (stability in the time period before the system-
of-systems is finalised), and ensuring cooperation (voluntary cooperation through 
incentives) (24).
3.2 Socio-technical systems
The term socio-technical systems origins from the Tavistock Institute research pro-
gram in the 1950s where the separate approach to either social or technical system 
was not seen as sufficient. A new approach where organisations were envisaged as 
socio-technical rather than either social or technical emerged (25). At present, the 
socio-technical theory is broadly acknowledged to refer to the joint optimisation 
between social and technical factors (26,27).
 Quality of work-life and democratic processes. In the period until the late 
1970s, the interest in socio-technical systems theory increased and socio-technical 
principles were defined to design systems with ‘quality of working life’ as the 
desired emergent property (26,28). The Scandinavian countries were pioneering 
the initiation of socio-technical design by legislating the cooperation between 
management and workforce, with emphasis on employees to participate in all levels 
of decision making. Several democratisation projects were initiated and the mindset 
on humanisation was a significant contributor for the laws on working conditions. 
The development did not come through without resistance, and in general two types 
of resistance were experienced. First, a common belief was that any management-
initiated change must be for the worse. Second, some engineers and technologists 
perceived changes to threaten their position and status. Additionally, some unions 
were negative intintroducing socio-technical principles since this could threaten 
their power and influence (26). Despite these obstacles, the democratic process and 
the humanisation of the work situation became important aspects associated with 
socio-technical systems.
 Automation and complexity. During the 1980s the situation for the industry 
changed drastically and could have become the dark ages of socio-technical the-
ory. From having problems getting enough staff, the increased use of technology 
reduced the need for workforce. Consequently, one of the main motivations for 
designing systems for the quality of working life diminished. The new focal point 
was cost-cutting, and the industry looked to lean production principles where 
standardisation of work processes stood opposed to the socio-technical systems 
principles of decentralised control and coordination. Socio-technical systems 
thinking lost its strong foothold, and the remaining expertise was found in dis-
persed, small groups (26). Several large accidents in the second half of the 1980s 
heavily affected the understanding of causes for accidents. The accidents Chernobyl 
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(1986), Challenger (1986), Zee-brugge (1987) and Dryden (1989) shifted the focus 
from human errors to organisational factors. Even though Robinson (29) argued 
for socio-technical systems principles could provide a design tool for safety prob-
lems already in the beginning of 1980s, the accidents regenerated the socio-tech-
nical systems theory’s relevance for safety almost a decade later (30). The interest 
for organisational causes transferred to cognitive science and human factors and 
moved these fields closer to the socio-technical field. Literature from organisa-
tional psychology from the 1950s influenced new methods and understanding the 
context became an important aspect (31).  Where the focus of cognitive science 
had been on the individual, the unit of analysis now shifted, and methods con-
sidering human and context together (Distributed Cognition (DC)) (32), 
or human(s) and technology in coagency (Cognitive Systems Engineering 
(CSE) and Joint Cognitive Systems) (33), emerged. A different challenge 
also caught attention in the aftermath of the disastrous accidents in the late 
80s; systems were becoming increasingly more complex. The interdepend-
ence between system components, and between the system and environ- 
ment, created unanticipated outcomes. Theories such as Normal Accident Theory 
(explaining accidents as inevitable due 
to complexity) (34) and High Reliability 
Organisations (defining characteristics of 
organisations coping with complexity) (35) 
became prominent in the safety discus-
sion. Complexity was incorporated in 
socio-technical systems thinking, and the 
term complex socio-technical system was 
used and dimensions for such complex-
ity defined (36). Such development was 
reflected when the socio-technical systems 
principles were revisited in 1987; both gath- 
ering and analysing data from users were 
highlighted (37) in the revised version.
 Thinking in levels. In the period from 
the mid-80s to the new millennium, cog- 
nitive science, human factors and socio- 
technical system theory blended and 
developed the foundation for the new 
ways of safety thinking. Organisations, 
as being socio-technical systems, differed 
between active failures (in the sharp 
end) and latent conditions (in the organ-
isations), and applied barriers to prevent 
accidents by managing the risks (38).   
 Towards the end of the 90s a significant 
perspective of socio-technical systems the-
ory gained interest; in addition to under- 
standing the system in context, the socio- 
technical system needed to be understood 
Fig. 2. Rasmussen levels of socio-technical 
systems (39) 
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in levels or layers (36,39). This way of considering the socio-technical system was 
first presented by Trist who presented an evolution from an initial focus on the 
primary work station, to whole organisation systems, and last at the macrosocial level 
(25). The need to engineer for safety, led to a focus between the human and organ-
isation, a concept building on cybernetics where the dynamic communication 
within systems is emphasised (40). In line with this, an important perspective for 
the development of socio-technical systems the last 20 years has been Rasmussen’s 
criticism of the research on socio-technical systems being studied separately by 
individual disciplines and concentrated at one level of the system. Fig. 2 presents 
Rasmussen’s socio-technical system at levels (from operation (bottom level) to top 
level): work, staff, management, company, regulators/associations, and government. 
Further, Rasmussen (41) argued for cross-disciplinary studies vertically across the 
different levels of socio-technical systems.
 Interdepencies and involving users in design. The socio-technical principles 
were revised for the third time by Clegg in 2000, motivated by the disappointing 
performance of technology itself and management practices in the development 
and implementation of new technologies (42). The revised socio-technical prin-
ciples aimed to again bring the social and technical together to an interdependent 
aspect of the work system. Clegg (43) pointed to organisations lack an integrated 
approach to technical and organisational changes, and that users do not have 
enough influence on system development. The revised set of principles intent was 
to contribute to design new systems, rather than only to understand the human and 
organisational impact of new technologies (42).
 System accident models and resilience. Apparently, the socio-technical systems 
theory in the field of design of complex systems has made a strong comeback 
after the moderate interest in the 1980s, and responds to organisations need for 
being adaptable, flexible, responsive and resilient (44). The perspective of levelled 
socio-technical systems has been the basis for a system perspective of the perfor-
mance of organisations. Particularly to understand and learn from accidents, this 
way of thinking has been prominent since 2000. Accident models such as STAMP 
(45), AcciMap (46), HFACS (47) have all applied the levelled perspective to move 
the focus from human error as the cause of an accident to organisational causes. 
A different, more proactive, application of socio-technical systems thinking is 
found in resilience engineering. The resilience perspective is focused on how the 
socio-technical system sustains required functioning in a variety of operation con-
ditions by highlighting how to succeed (rather than fail) by adapting the perfor-
mance to the environment (9,48). 
4  A socio-technical approach to the future VTS
The principles of socio-technical systems theory have been revisited over the last 60 
years. From the focus on quality of work-life to focus on system safety, and in the 
later years a call for socio-technical systems thinking proactively in systems design. 
Many of the leading methods for assessing safety in complex systems (e.g STAMP, 
FRAM, HFACS), based on systems theory, share the theoretical framework as 
socio-technical systems theory. These methods take the necessary systemic per-
spective that explores the relationships between causal factors within the systems 
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and addresses the complexity known to be important for improving safety in mod-
ern organisations (45,49,50). On the other hand, the methods share a challenge of 
being time-consuming to apply, resource-intensive, and often relying on detailed 
and high-qualitative data (45,49–51). When designing future systems, the detail 
level is low and the uncertainty high. Consequently, it is difficult to apply such 
systemic safety models to support the initial design phase. The comprehensiveness 
of the methods could, therefore, become a barrier that leads to them not being used 
before design solutions are chosen. In turn, this shows that the methods might not 
be the right answer to Clegg’s call for including users in the design phase (42). The 
following section presents a simplified approach to the discussion of the future 
VTS. It argues that a democratic process and a systemic evaluation of internal and 
external consequences of changes reflects a socio-technical systems approach in the 
early design phase of the future VTS.
4.1 Identifying the future role of the VTS is a democratic process
A democratic focus on the workforce has been a cornerstone in socio-technical 
systems theory. The democratic focus includes different aspects of emphasising 
the workers in the organisations. In the early phase of socio-technical thinking, 
by aiming for humanisation of the work situation, the employees were included 
to determine the required quality of work life (26). Later, the democratic focus 
was mainly about understanding cognitive activities in man-machine systems 
(52) and human performance in light of latent conditions (38). User involvement 
has been emphasised to design systems that are capable of self-modification (28), 
where both technical and social experts are needed for joint optimisation (37). User 
involvement from all levels of decision-making (26) and being open for consulting 
and informing colleagues (28) have been underlined as being necessary. Not only 
to understand socio-technical systems, but also in the design of such systems by 
involving the responsible for manage, use and support of the new system (42). 
 The development of socio-technical systems theory has shown several different 
aspects to why the democratic process is needed. To identify the future role of the 
VTS, it is necessary to initiate a democratic process where these aspects are under-
stood and implemented.
 The first step is to involve the VTS-organisation in the design phase. It is nec-
essary to come back to the potential technology development in the MTS, and the 
present attention to autonomous vessels. In this development, the VTS could be a 
reactive system component that adapts its behaviour to the emerging requirements 
caused by new technology. The other option is to take a stance that the VTS could 
contribute to a safe and efficient MTS by a proactive approach focusing a joint opti-
misation between the VTS and the other system components. Hence, the involve-
ment of the VTS organisation by anchoring the need for discussing the future role 
of the VTS is the first step. 
 The second step is to nominate users to be a part of the design process. Implicit 
in the socio-technical term, both technical and social expert knowledge is needed. 
As experts in an organisation do not come from either a technical silo or an oper-
ational silo, it is necessary to find a strategy to select people with knowledge from 
various expert areas in the organisation. The selection strategy should also war-
rant ownership, and people responsible for managing, using, and supporting the 
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future system should be selected. There are several levels in the organisation that 
manages the VTS (see discussion of internal effects), and the selection of users 
should be representative for the various levels. The users of the future VTS could be 
represented as the VTS-operators. However, all VTS-operators should not be put 
in the same category. As an example, some operators could be more interested in 
technical solutions and functionalities, while others have their interest in concept 
development. Consequently, such variety should be reflected when selecting users. 
The support of the future VTS could be both administrative and technical person-
nel,and representatives for the support element need to be included. A common 
quality of all the involved personnel is that they need to be open to communicating 
and consulting colleagues about assessments from the design phase.
 The abovementioned two steps aim to find the people from the organisation 
with the ‘correct’ expert knowledge from the different levels in the organisation, 
with ownership to the design process and being open for sharing and discussing 
with colleagues. There is no recipe for exactly how to reach such a goal. However, 
good cooperation between internal organisational expertise and expertise about 
socio-technical systems theory could be considered beneficial. The internal exper-
tise of the VTS-organisation will provide knowledge about the organisational 
structure, areas of expertise, and persons with different areas of interest. Expertise 
in socio-technical expertise could guide the selection process, so no expert areas 
are over-emphasised. Further, such expertise could make sure that the various 
aspects of the socio-technical democratic process are understood, and conse-
quently, reduce the risk of just putting some people together and start discussing. 
4.2 A systemic approach evaluating internal and external effects 
The systems perspective as a foundation for the socio-technical systems theory 
points to the interactions within the system and between systems. The VTS is a 
part of the MTS, and as such interconnected with the other component systems. 
As such, deciding on the future role of the VTS will affect the other systems in 
the MTS. To understand the interplay between VTS design and the MTS design 
is therefore crucial. However, as the types and number of interconnections could 
be infinite, it is necessary to limit what to assess in evaluating how the future VTS 
would affect the MTS. The following section presents how the use of system-of-sys-
tems design principles could guide the discussion of the interplay between VTS 
and MTS.
 Consequently, internal effects for designing the future VTS are important. The 
perspective in system safety models highlights the connection between the oper-
ator and the rest of the organisation. In the last section, a broader perspective on 
implications for future VTS is suggested, and an adapted version of Rasmussen’s 
levels of socio-technical system is used as a framework for the discussion.
4.2.1 The interplay between MTS design and VTS design
As presented in the background, there is no static MTS. However, the bridge per-
sonnel, VTS-operators, and pilots could be considered components of the sys-
tem. Additionally, the parent organisations of these operators and more distinct 
actors affect the system. In sum, these components collaborate to achieve a safe 
and efficient traffic flow, and they are integrated through rules, regulations, and 
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communication. Consequently, one could argue that the MTS is a collaborative and 
integrated system. The next question is if the MTS is a system or a system-of-sys-
tems. Following Maier’s (24) taxonomy the components need to be operationally 
independent and managerial independent of each other to be a system-of-systems. 
Maier has evaluated the system-of-systems properties of an Intelligent Transport 
System (ITS) (53) and the similarities to the MTS could guide the assessment.  
 To decide if the component systems are managerial independent, an evaluation 
of the components being acquired and operated independently is needed. Shipping 
companies are owned and run by a variety of actors, and these are most certainly 
independent of each other. The VTS and pilot service are normally managed by the 
government, and to a certain degree have some common management. However, 
in sum, the component systems in the MTS could be stated to be managerial inde-
pendent from each other. The next criterium is being operational independent. As 
Maier states in his evaluation of an ITS, the operation is a mixture of individual 
and government action. In the MTS the vessels could operate independent of each 
other, and potentially independent without VTS and pilots. The VTS and pilots 
will have no function without vessels in the area; however, it is possible to claim 
they are operational independent since they are not relying on another component 
system to function. In sum, the conclusion is that the MTS, in conformity as the 
ITS, is a collaborative and integrated system, and further fulfil both criteria of being 
a system-of-systems.
 The perspective of the MTS being a system-of-systems is important in the 
discussion of the future VTS. The design of VTS will to a large extent affect the 
design of the future MTS. Consequently, the design principles for successful sys-
tem-of-systems propose a solid base for discussing the interplay between VTS 
design and MTS design (24). 
 Policy triage. The most significant impact is that opposed to systems design it 
is not possible to fully control the configuration (e.g. traffic flow) or the evolution 
(e.g. design of vessels) of system-of-systems. A consequence is that even if the VTS 
is defined as a control system, it cannot fully control the systems in the MTS. The 
VTS as being a socio-technical system is in control when it creates a stable perfor-
mance output (9,33). When designing the future VTS, it is therefore important to 
focus on the balance of what to try to control and what not to control, and how the 
VTS could contribute to a safe and efficient performance in the MTS. Maier (24) 
warns against over-control (will fail due to lack of authority) and under-control 
(will fail due to eliminating the system nature in the integrated system). 
 Leverage at the interfaces. Since the component systems have independent 
properties, the architecture of system-of-systems needs to consider the interfaces 
between the systems. One major change is the interface between the autonomous 
and conventional vessel, and it will basically be an interface between technology 
(autonomous vessel) and humans (conventional vessel and VTS). This will be a 
novel situation and requires a different way of communicating than today. The 
present solution to create a mutual understanding is sharing information and 
intentions on voice communication, and often relying on informal ways of operat-
ing. In a future MTS, it could be expected that autonomous vessel could be great at 
following formalised rules but poor at understanding informal ways of operating 
and sharing information and intentions as it is done today. Consequently, differ- 
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ent interfaces than the traditional voice communication need to be considered, and 
the future VTS should consider how it could improve interfaces between future 
system components. 
 Stable intermediate forms. Intermediate stability relates to the period until a 
future MTS is constructed and finalised. Such an approach could be argued to be 
artificial since an MTS will never reach an end-state. However, testing and eval-
uation, initially as individual components and later as integrated systems (21) is 
important. For autonomy, this implies that the concept will be tested in parts, but 
later also as a component system in the MTS. 
 Ensuring cooperation. The systems being collaborative, and at the same time 
independent, leads to cooperation in the MTS being to a certain degree voluntary. 
The cooperation in a future MTS with autonomous vessels will to a larger degree be 
between unequal actors, with both conventional vessels, autonomous vessels, most 
likely a shore control centre and a VTS. The development needs to find the right 
balance where formalised rules and control of the system is considered in the light 
of providing enough flexibility to users.
 Designing a VTS should aim for contributing to stable performance of safety and 
efficiency in the MTS. The design principles for systems-of-systems are applicable 
to the design of the MTS, and due to VTS being a control system of the MTS, also 
applicable for understanding the interplay between VTS solutions and the MTS. 
4.2.2 The internal effects for the VTS
An important element in the systems theory is 
the control system that regulates the behaviour of 
the overall system. In the socio-technical systems 
theory this has been reflected since the increasing 
automation of the industrial processes. The role 
of humans changed from being directly involved 
in the action, to decision making and problem 
solving (52). Even if the technology changed and 
seemed to take a larger portion of the duties, the 
human element became more important to control 
processes. The understanding of the human role 
in relation combined with organisational causes 
became important. Initially, this relationship was 
explained linearly, with latent conditions and swiss 
cheese (38). Later the relationship was understood 
by more complex systems models with increased 
awareness of the multiple connections between the 
operator and the organisation (45,49,50).
 Rasmussen’s levelled model of socio-technical 
systems visualised and formed much of the present 
understanding of socio-technical systems. In the 
following section, it is argued that the model could 
be a tool in the initial design of new socio-tech-
nical systems. The democratic process previously 
discussed, involves personnel from the entire or- 
Fig. 3. The Norwegian VTS organi- 
zation visualized in Rasmussen’s 
socio-technical models
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ganisation, and the model could initially be used to make sure that all levels are rep-
resented in the process. Fig. 3 represents a suggested visualisation of the Norwegian 
VTS-organisation by applying Rasmussen’s model. The governmental level is 
defined to be the Ministry of Transportation (MoT), who is responsible for the 
service. Regulators and associations are both the MoT and the Norwegian Coastal 
Administration (NCA) since they both have responsibilities for the Harbour and 
Fairways Act. The company-level points to NCA and the Department of Maritime 
Safety. The management level is the VTS managers of the individual VTS centres. 
Staff is the crew on duty, and finally the work is the individual VTS-operator.
 The essential step of the democratic process is to discuss potential solutions and 
evaluate the effects of these solutions. The complexity in discussing VTS-roles is 
the interplay between the VTS and the MTS as discussed in the former section. 
Further, the consequences for the VTS itself need to be understood. As Rasmussen 
highlights, the consequences are different on the various levels of the organization. 
As such, the future roles of the VTS should be evaluated by understanding the 
consequences for each of the levels in the model as shown in Fig. 4.
A benefit of using the model is that it is not dependent on a high detail level. In the 
initial phase of designing future systems, the granularity is low, the discussion of 
implications might be on an overall level. However, even with a low level of detail, 
it is possible to identify obstacles that require attention. As an example, if auton-
Fig. 4. The consequences of changes to the VTS should be 
assessed on the various socio-technical systems levels
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omy calls for different interactions between vessels and VTS-operator, a change of 
regulations might be required. By only focusing on the VTS-operator, such changes 
could easily be omitted by arguing it is not possible due to regulations.  However, 
by using the model, it is possible to keep it as an option and raise the argument of 
changing regulations to the regulator level.
 The intention of the model is to understand interaction, between the levels. A 
risk of thinking in levels is ignoring such interaction and focus on the individual 
level and losing the overall objective. Hence, the process must be goal-oriented, 
asking what is required to meet the proposed solution. The answer will point to 
consequences for the levels and for the interaction. 
 In the initial design phase, the model could provide a good basis for discussion 
and deciding direction. The visualisation of the model is easy to communicate and 
to apply as a start of a discussion. Further, it facilitates that everyone involved in 
the design process are given a voice. However, the pitfall of ignoring interaction is 
a major risk that must be addressed before and during the process.
5 Conclusion
The future MTS with autonomous vessels will be different from the present. The 
differences will not be merely about the autonomous vessel itself; it will also be the 
changes in the interaction between all actors in the MTS. This understanding calls 
for a holistic approach to discussing the future MTS. The VTS is a control system 
that contributes to a safe and efficient MTS, and consequently, the VTS is essential 
in the discussion of autonomy in the MTS. The VTS could take a reactive stance, 
perceiving autonomy being a designer challenge of making autonomous vessels 
that have the same capabilities as the conventional vessel. The other option is a 
proactive approach, where the VTS takes ownership to the overall objectives of the 
MTS and assess how the VTS could adapt to the future need. 
 The paper has suggested a proactive socio-technical systems approach to dis-
cuss a democratic process and evaluate the systemic internal and external effects 
of changes for the future VTS. The history of socio-technical systems theory shows 
a development affected by societal trends and being affected by, and merging into, 
other approaches. 
 The paper has argued the democratic process has several aspects, ranging from 
understanding users to user involvement in design. However, the focus on workers 
has been common denominator through history and is consequently perceived 
as a cornerstone of the socio-technical systems theory. The paper has proposed 
a democratic process involving people from the entire VTS organisation with a 
variety of competencies is necessary to find solutions and to warrant ownership in 
the design phase.
 Further, the paper has argued for the systemic perspective being another 
cornerstone of the socio-technical systems theory. The history has shown the 
importance of understanding human performance in a broader perspective than 
the individual operator. Consequently, the paper has suggested to applying a 
levelled socio-technical model to understand internal consequences to potential 
changes. Such an approach aims to provide an insight of the consequences at the 
various levels, but additionally, for the interaction between the levels. 
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The proactive approach calls for a holistic evaluation of the future VTS. The paper 
suggests considering the MTS a system-of-systems and apply the system-of-sys-
tems design principles. Subsequently, the VTS as a control system needs to con-
sider how it could contribute to positively affect the design principles of the MTS 
when discussing the future role of the VTS.
 In sum, the paper has presented a complex challenge of taking a systems per-
spective of discussing the future role of the VTS. The paper has argued that a sim-
plified socio-technical approach could support the discussion in the early design 
phase of the future VTS.
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